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[I]  Abstract: As technology advances, the threat of rampant and 
unprecedented theft of digital media continues to grow.  The music 
industry has already faced, and continues to face, this threat, but has 
largely failed in defending musicians’ intellectual property.   
 
[II]  With the advent and increasing popularity of high-speed Internet 
connections, Hollywood faces the same dilemma and is fighting back.  As 
a Time magazine writer recently noted,  
 
Studio executives, no strangers to melodrama, have begun 
to talk about movie piracy the way FBI agents talk about 
terrorism: they watch the Web for “chatter,” they embed 
films with hidden “fingerprints,” and they speak without 
irony about “changing hearts and minds.” They even use 
night-vision goggles.  It’s not going too far to say they are 
completely paranoid, which doesn’t mean they are wrong.3   
 
 
                                                          
1 Ms. Engelman is a third year law student at the Florida State University College of 
Law and a 2001 graduate of the University of Georgia with a B.A. in International 
Business and a minor in German.  
2 Mr. Scott is a practicing attorney in Tallahassee, Florida, a 2002 graduate of the 
Florida State University College of Law, and received his B.S. in Business 
Administration–Economics from the University of Florida.  He is a member of the 
Florida and Texas Bars. 
3 Amanda Ripley, Hollywood Robbery: How Does a Hit Movie Go from the Free 
Market to the Black Market?  Time Retraces the Trail, TIME, Jan. 26, 2004, at 56. 
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[III]  Indeed, the battle rages.  But is guerilla warfare the best method to 
fight a “menace” that may represent Hollywood’s greatest opportunity?  
To ensure success on ongoing profitability, the movie industry must mind 
the lessons of the music industry’s failures, forge its own path, and 
embrace the wonder that is the Internet.  This article examines the music 
industry’s efforts to fight e-piracy, discusses Hollywood’s limited efforts 
and perhaps Hollywood’s only remaining viable alternative in fighting, or 
embracing, this growing menace.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  The Internet has changed the world.  Never before has mankind 
communicated on such an immense scale or had endless information at its 
fingertips.  But with advancement comes the specter of unprecedented 
exploitation.   
 
[2]  Underscoring the lack, or inadequacy, of Internet regulation, Internet 
users circumvent established laws, notably the Copyright Act of 1976,4 
with impunity.  Despite the well-publicized litigation in A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,5 web-surfers in the United States and around the 
world continue to share copyrighted digital media files such as MP3 files.6   
 
[3]  The e-pirate’s adventure, however, is growing riskier as the music and 
movie industries are increasingly aiming their cannons away from Internet 
server providers (“ISPs”) and taking aim at minors and unsuspecting 
parents.  As the above quote suggests, e-piracy is prompting the music and 
movie industries to take drastic measures to fend off this burgeoning 
threat.  Technology has made it possible to pirate both movies and music 
in little time, with little effort and with little to no quality distortion.  
According to both industries, ever-changing and advancing technological 
“innovations” are decreasing sales and costing jobs.7  As a result of e-
piracy, the music industry lost approximately $2.4 billion in 2003, and the 
film industry loses approximately $3 billion every year.8   
 
[4]  E-piracy is clearly theft.  For many, however, downloading music and 
movies onto one’s private computer does not pain the conscience as does 
walking out of a store with a CD or DVD under one’s coat.  Accordingly, 
the music industry is shifting its attention towards litigation, education and 
efficient profit-making services.  However, convincing Internet users that 
downloading violates copyright law (a fact lost on many pre-teen or 
teenaged e-pirates) and is no different than pilfering compact discs from 
                                                          
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000). 
5 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
6 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
7 See Lev Grossman, It’s All Free!; Music! Movies! TV shows! Millions of People 
Download Them Every Day.  Is Digital Piracy Killing the Entertainment Industry?, TIME, 
May 5, 2003, at 60, 60-63. 
8 Ripley, supra note 3, at 56; Study: Music Piracy Has 5 Years of Growth, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 23, 2003, at 12. 
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one’s favorite music shop, is an immense challenge.  The process is slow, 
and meanwhile the industries and artists continue to lose money.9  
Fortunately for both industries, Congress is aware of the rampant 
lawlessness and is acting, albeit limitedly, in response.10  The music 
industry (and to a lesser degree Hollywood) is not sitting idly by while its 
coffer is raided; it continues to materialize its educational and commercial 
efforts against piracy.  The music industry has filed numerous suits against 
ISPs and individual users in an effort to stop illegal downloading and 
demonstrate its resolve.11  In contrast, Hollywood’s litigation efforts are 
moving more slowly, perhaps because technological developments have 
only recently allowed DVD downloading with ease and speed.12  In 2003, 
4.3 million households in North America upgraded to broadband,13 and 
from March 2002 to March 2003, the percentage of American households 
with high-speed connections rose from 21% to 31%.14  Currently, 39% of 
all adult Internet users have high-speed Internet access at home.15 
 
[5]  Hollywood has the opportunity to learn valuable lessons about 
combating the negative effects of e-commerce, and its potential financial 
benefits, from the music industry’s failed model.  Although the movie 
industry launched nearly 3000 private investigations across the United 
States in 2003,16 Hollywood has failed to establish a unified front in the 
                                                          
9 See Matthew C. Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment 
Industry’s Arsenal in its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 674 (2003).  
10 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (includes criminal offenses, specifically 
criminal infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (includes circumvention of copyright 
protection systems).  
11 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 
2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). 
12 Christian John Pantages, Avast Ye, Hollywood! Digital Motion Picture Piracy 
Comes of Age, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW 155, 163 (Winter 2002). 
13 Larry Dobrow, Broadband Growth Numbers Spur Contention (August 6, 2004), at 
http://www.mediapost.com/dtls_dsp_news.cfm?cb=050942P&newsID=263077&newsDa
te=08/06/2004 (last visited October 3, 2004). 
14 Beatrice E. Garcia, More Users Surfing Web at High Speed, MIAMI HERALD, May 
19, 2003, at 3A, available at 
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/5892656.htm?template=contentModules/
printstory.jsp. 
15 Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, MPAA Launches New 
Phase of Aggressive Education Campaign Against Movie Piracy (June 15, 2004), at 
http://www.respectcopyrights.com/FINAL_6-15-04_STOPP_%20Press_Release.doc. 
16 See Tom Hays, Cop Shooting Casts Light on Piracy Battle (June 19, 2004), at 
http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php?story=04/06/21/1528235. 
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fight against e-piracy.17  In order to ensure success, Hollywood must forge 
its own path while minding the mistakes and missed opportunities of the 
music industry.  Hollywood must view the Internet as an opportunity to be 
exploited, and not waste valuable resources and squander public goodwill 
in its jealous effort to protect the property rights of artists. 
 
II. STEMMING THE TIDE: COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
[6]  To promote the arts and sciences, the U.S. Constitution provides 
intellectual property creators with exclusive rights to their works for a 
limited duration.18  To further effectuate the Constitution’s purpose, the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) provides that a copyright lasts 
for the artist’s lifetime plus seventy years.19  The copyright owner may 
control certain uses of his work20 and can bring legal action if this 
copyright is violated.21  Remedies for copyright violations include 
injunctions, monetary damages and criminal penalties.22  The Copyright 
Act, however, provides exceptions for uses in fields such as education and 
research.23 
 
[7]  In the last decade, the Copyright Act has been amended to include 
provisions that focus on digital piracy.24  In 1997, the aptly-named No 
Electronic Theft Act (“NETA”) imposed criminal liability on providers of 
free access to copyrighted works.25  Although NETA originally penalized 
only those who realized commercial advantage or private financial gain, it 
currently penalizes those who merely provide access.26  
 
[8]  The Copyright Act’s second amendment, 1998’s Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),27 provides greater protection against 
                                                          
17 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 
2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting defendant 
software vendors’ motions for summary judgment on claims of copyright infringement). 
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
19 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
20 Id. § 106 (listing the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
21 Id. § 501(b). 
22 Id. § 506; 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000). 
23 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-08 (2000). 
24 Mousley, supra note 9, at 678. 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 505(a). 
26 Mousley, supra note 9, at 678. 
27 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1122 Stat. 2680 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.) 
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infringement accomplished through encryption circumvention.28  The 
DMCA enacted following the adoption of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty29 and aids the fight against recent 
technological developments that provide access to digital media via digital 
code breaking, including various DVD copying applications.30  The 
DMCA penalizes efforts to “circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected [by United States 
Copyright Law].”31  Additionally it is unlawful under the DMCA to 
“manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in 
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that . 
. . is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a [protected] 
work.”32  For repeat offenders, the DMCA imposes fines of up to $1 
million and prison terms up to ten years.33  Since its passage, the DMCA 
has become an important, hotly-litigated, and repeatedly contested weapon 
against copyright infringement.34 
 
[9]  Additionally, the DMCA’s subpoena provision has been used to 
identify individual copyright violators by commandeering ISPs’ user IP 
lists.35  However, the Verizon decision in late 2003, discussed below, dealt 
a serious blow to the music industry’s effort to identify and pursue alleged 
violators.   
 
III. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY FIGHTS BACK 
 
A. Direct Hit! - A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 
 
[10]  The recording industry began its attack by seeking preliminary 
injunctions against sites that made copyrighted music available to web 
                                                          
28 See Mousley, supra note 9, at 679. 
29 World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 65; see also 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 
1093-94 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
30 Mousley, supra note 9, at 680. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679. 
32 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2000); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679. 
33 § 1204(a)(2); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679. 
34 See Mousley, supra note 9, at 680 (discussing criticism and consumer group 
opponents of the DMCA). 
35 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000); see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon 
Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a subpoena could be 
issued only to an ISP engaged in storing on its servers material that was infringing or the 
subject of infringing activity, and not to a mere conduit ISP). 
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users.36  The first breakthrough was the well-publicized injunction against 
Napster, Inc.,37 which led to Napster’s eventual downfall.  Napster’s 
website allowed users to download music from Napster-run “host users” 
for free.38  Napster’s server software enabled users to search and locate the 
MP3 files of other users.39  It then communicated the Internet address of 
the “host user” to the requesting user, and this connection allowed users to 
download directly from the other’s computer, a process called “peer-to-
peer” (“P2P”) networking.40  In 2001, A&M Records, Inc. (“A&M”) filed 
suit against Napster, alleging contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement, and sought a preliminary injunction.41   
 
[11]  First, A&M claimed that Napster was liable for contributory 
copyright infringement because Napster not only knew its users were 
using its software to illegally download copyrighted music, but it 
facilitated such conduct.42  Second, A&M claimed that Napster was 
vicariously liable for infringement.43 
 
[12]  To be contributively liable for infringement, Napster had to “‘know 
or have reason to know’ of direct infringement” by its users and contribute 
to such conduct.44  The court found that Napster had both actual and 
constructive knowledge of the illegal activity.45  Such “actual” knowledge 
was based largely on a memo written by co-founder Sean Parker, 
emphasizing Napster’s “‘need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and 
IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated music.’”46  Additionally, 
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) previously 
informed Napster that more than 12,000 copyrighted songs were available 
                                                          
36 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(granting preliminary injunction and preliminarily enjoining defendant from enabling 
Internet users to copy, download and distribute copyrighted music); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), 
aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying plaintiffs’ actions for copyright 
infringement against defendants software vendors due to lack of control over networks 
and infringing use of users). 
37 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004. 
38 See id. at 1012. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1019. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1019-20. 
45 Id. at 1020. 
46 Id. 
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on Napster’s site.47  “Constructive” knowledge was demonstrated by both 
the fact that Napster executives themselves actively downloaded music as 
well as Napster’s promotion of copyrighted works on its site.48  
Accordingly, the court concluded that Napster had knowledge of direct 
infringement, and the court found Napster contributively liable for 
infringement for failing to halt such conduct.49  The court noted that 
without Napster, its users would be unable to find and download 
copyrighted music it made available, thus satisfying the second element: 
contributing to the infringing conduct.50   
 
[13]  To be liable for vicarious infringement, Napster must have possessed 
the “‘right and ability’” to supervise its users and must have had a 
financial interest in the activity.51  The court found that Napster’s 
customers were attracted to free copyrighted music facilitated through its 
site, and as its customer roster increased, so did its profits.52  Thus, 
Napster benefited financially.53  Additionally, the court found that Napster 
had the ability to supervise and stop the illegal activity,54 despite its “lack 
of user control” argument.55  On its website, Napster affirmed its “‘right to 
refuse service and terminate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not 
limited to, if Napster believes that user conduct violates applicable law . . . 
or for any reason in Napster’s sole discretion, with or without cause.’”56  
Accordingly, Napster was found vicariously liable.57 
 
[14]  Napster defended its actions through the Copyright Act’s “Fair Use 
Doctrine,”58 which allows use of copyrighted works for certain purposes, 
including criticism, teaching, and research.59  In evaluating the doctrine’s 
applicability, courts must examine: (1) the use’s purpose and character—
whether commercial or educational; (2) the “nature of the copyrighted 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1021-22. 
50 Id. at 1022. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1023. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 1020, 1023. 
56 Id. at 1023. 
57 Id. at 1024. 
58 Id. at 1014. 
59 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000). 
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work”; (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion of used”; and (4) 
the effect upon the potential market.60   
 
[15]  The court rejected Napster’s fair use argument, holding that merely 
putting a work into a different format (i.e. transforming songs to a 
downloadable format) is not “fair use.”61  Moreover, the copyrighted work 
was used for commercial, rather than personal, purposes.62  Additionally, 
when analyzed with respect to market effect, Napster harmed the market 
by reducing music sales and preventing the music industry from 
succeeding online.63  After rejecting Napster’s arguments, and finding it 
liable for contributory and vicarious infringement, the court enjoined 
Napster’s operations based on A&M’s showing of likelihood of success 
and irreparable harm if the conduct continued.64   
 
[16]  In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower 
court’s decision and ruled that any copyrighted works had to be removed 
from Napster’s site.65  This ruling prompted musicians such as Metallica 
to file complaints against Napster demanding removal of their music.66  
Later that year, the once-mighty Napster was forced to shut down its site.67 
 
[17]  After its shut down in June 2001, Napster collaborated with 
MusicNet to make its music available through subscription services.68  
However, in 2002, the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was 
sold to BMG for $8 million.69 
 
[18]  While the Napster holding appeared to deliver the coup de grace to 
ISPs that store and distribute copyrighted works, in the face of providers 
that utilize the P2P model, its applicability has been limited.   
                                                          
60 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. 
61 Id. at 1015. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 1016. 
64 Id. at 1029. 
65 Id. 
66 BBC News, Metallica Joins New Napster Attack (Mar. 29, 2001), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/new_media/1249347.stm (last visited June 21, 
2004). 
67 Associated Press, Napster Still Offline (July 21, 2001), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/12/tech/main301149.shtml. 
68 Michael Singer, Napster Joins MusicNet Service (June 6, 2001), at 
http://wwwInternetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/77981 (last visited June 21, 2004). 
69 Michael Singer, Napster Sold for $8 Million (May 17, 2002), at 
http://siliconvalley.Internet.com/news/article.php/1140801 (last visited June 21, 2004). 
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B. Return Fire! - MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
 
[19]  In MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the court faced essentially the same 
issue posed in Napster: whether the defendants were liable for 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement.70  However, Grokster, 
Ltd. (“Grokster”) and StreamCast Networks, Inc. (“StreamCast”), 
distributors of Morpheus software, avoided liability due to their loose 
control over users’ conduct.71   
 
[20]  Grokster, like Napster, provides downloadable software.72  In 
contrast to Napster, however, Grokster’s role ends once a user is 
connected to the network, as the user then shares files via P2P 
networking.73  Moreover, when users search and transfer files using 
Grokster software, they do so without utilizing Grokster computers.74  
Thus, when a user logs off, the user’s music is no longer available.75  This 
severance allows Grokster and StreamCast to remain ignorant as to what 
music is available at any given time.76  If Grokster shuts down, users can 
still share files with no interruption.77   
 
[21]  Although the Grokster court determined that the defendants 
purposely ignored user names and IP addresses, it did not hold Grokster 
liable for contributory infringement, finding that once Grokster distributed 
the software, it could not control whether the software will be used for 
unlawful purposes.78   
 
IV. RECORDING INDUSTRY’S POST-GROKSTER STRATEGIES 
 
[22]  The key difference between Napster and Grokster is centralized 
control over user conduct.  Grokster’s P2P structure prevented centralized 
control; thus, there was no central Grokster server to indicate which files 
had been downloaded.79  While Napster relied on centralized 
                                                          
70 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1032. 
73 Id. at 1040. 
74 Id. 
75 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. at 1041. 
78 Id. at 1043. 
79 Id. at 1040. 
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communication architecture to identify available MP3 files, the current 
generation of P2P programs allows users to search MP3 libraries of others 
directly through downloaded software with no website involved.80 
 
[23]  Similarly, the court found that Grokster was not vicariously liable.81  
As noted, vicarious infringement extends liability to those who have a 
right and ability to supervise infringing activity and a direct financial 
interest in those activities.82  Knowledge is not a requirement.83  Although 
Grokster derived benefit through advertising, it had no control over its 
product’s use.84  Thus, it lacked the ability to supervise.85 
 
[24]  The Grokster decision underscores the importance of control.  
Without evidence of control over the ability to download copyrighted 
music, courts will not likely hold a provider liable, regardless of whether it 
remained ignorant of user activity.  Not surprisingly, other operations, like 
KaZaa and Gnutella, have exploited the de-centralized P2P model.86   
 
[25]  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the 
district court’s decision in Grokster.87  It appears that P2P sharing, from 
the application provider’s perspective, does not violate anti-infringement 
laws and that these providers are safe barring an appeal and adverse ruling 
by the Supreme Court or contrary legislation from Congress.  The movie 
industry currently faces a similar attack, and Napster and Grokster hold 
important lessons for Hollywood in its effort to stem movie piracy 
perpetrated via P2P networks. 
 
[26] In light of the Grokster failure, as well as the increase of P2P 
popularity, the RIAA is now pursuing individual users.88  In the summer 
                                                          
80 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Douglas Litchman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for 
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 403, 
408-09 (2003)). 
81 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
82 Id. (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022). 
83 Id. (citing Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 
(C.D. Cal. 2001)). 
84 Id. at 1044-45. 
85 Id. at 1045-46. 
86 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 60. 
87 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
88 John Borland, New RIAA File-swapping Suits Filed, CNET News, (Mar. 23, 
2004). at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5177933.html. 
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of 2003, the music industry commenced a widespread, yet selective, 
offensive against individual downloaders.89  The RIAA has since sued 
over 1900 users, with more than 400 users paying fines averaging $3000.90  
In March 2004, the RIAA brought an additional 532 lawsuits against 
anonymous users, including eighty-nine individuals from universities.91  
However, the RIAA was recently prohibited from bringing a single action 
against hundreds of anonymous users.92 Instead, it must sue individually 
using the expensive and tedious “John Doe” method.93  Despite this 
setback, the RIAA continues its fight.94 
 
[27]  The RIAA’s efforts have moved beyond U.S. borders to Australia, 
the home of KaZaa. 95  In March 2003, the Music Industry Privacy 
Investigations unit96 obtained a court order allowing it to raid KaZaa’s 
headquarters and executives’ homes.97  However, the RIAA was told that 
it could not review the seized documents until the matter resumed in U.S. 
federal court in the summer of 2004.98  Nonetheless, while the RIAA 
continues the lengthy process of building its case, KaZaa remains a 
popular site for downloading music, though Nielsen/Netratings show that 
the lawsuit has had an effect on usage.99   
 
                                                          
89 Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, The High Cost of Sharing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 
2003, at B1. 
90 Borland, supra note 88. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95Abby Dinham, Sharman May Appeal Court Ruling, CNET News, (Mar. 4, 2004), 
at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5170198.html 
96 The MIPI is run by the Australian Recording Industry Association to oversee all 
music piracy issues in the music industry.  Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Music Industry Piracy Investigations: Description, at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/288585/fromItemId/340639 (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
97 Sam Varghese, Kazaa Case: Access to Seized Materials Delayed, The Age, (Mar. 
24, 2004), at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/24/1079939686550.html  
98 Id. 
99 “The Kazaa software, the most popular file-trading application, also saw usage fall 
15 percent, from 6.5 million to 5.5 million unique users [the week ending June 29, 2004], 
according to Neilson/Netratings.”  John Borland, RIAA Threat May Be Slowing File 
Swapping, CNET News, (July 14, 2003), at 
http://news.com.com/RIAA+threat+may+be+slowing+file+swapping/2100-1027_3-
1025684.html. 
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[28]  While the recording industry continues to combat the still-existing 
sites that facilitate e-piracy, record sales continue to decline.100  Although 
the decline slowed in 2003, retail sales dropped about 4.3%.101  One 
suggested solution to remedy this decline is offering songs online to users 
at a low price.102  Perhaps this is a wise move considering MP3 player 
sales have increased 56%.103   
 
[29]  In 2003, Apple launched iTunes, which allows Mac and non-Mac 
users  to download songs for $0.99 each.104  Online music stores like 
iTunes not only give consumers the option to download only the songs 
they desire without having to buy an entire album, they allow artists to 
release individual tracks without releasing a complete album.105  At the 
conclusion of 2004’s first quarter, Apple reported that iTunes sold 50 
million songs, with 2.5 million more songs downloaded every week.106  
Following iTunes’ success, new competitors, including Roxio’s Napster 
and MusicMatch, have entered the fray.107   
 
[30]  The RIAA is continuing its campaign to educate users concerning the 
illegality of downloading pirated music.  The message is simple: e-pirates 
are breaking the law and possibly ruining the music industry, and if 
consumers stop buying albums, the incentive for creativity evaporates 
(assuming the traditional album is the only available medium of 
expression).  The RIAA’s campaign also emphasizes the effect that losses 
have not just on artists, executives, and producers, but also on “lesser” 
industry employees whose names never appear on a marquee.108 
 
[31]  The RIAA’s efforts appear to be working.  According to a July 2004 
survey, “64 percent of those surveyed believe it is illegal to make music 
from the computer available for others to download for free.”109  While 
                                                          
100 John Borland, Record Sales Down, But Seen as Stabilizing, CNET News, (Mar. 4, 
2004), at http://news.com.com/2110-1027-5169904.html. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. 
103 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 64. 
104 Leander Kahney, Apple Launches Paid Music Service, (Apr. 28, 2003), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,58656,00.html. 
105 Id. 
106 See Ina Fried, Apple’s iTunes Sales Hit 50 Million, (Mar. 15, 2004), at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5173115.html. 
107 Id. 
108 See generally Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 15. 
109 Grant Gross, RIAA Files 896 New File-Trading Lawsuits, (Aug. 25, 2004), at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article.php/20040825203958223. 
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this figure may indicate a true change in perception, it remains to be seen 
whether such knowledge equates to any decrease in illegal downloading.  
Film and music downloading sites and software applications are still quite 
popular; KaZaa was once downloaded more than 1.9 million times in a 
single week.110  
 
[32]  The “education method” may have another important advantage: 
avoiding the ire of Internet terrorists.  In March 2004, the RIAA’s website 
shut down for five days due to a “MyDoom” virus attack .111  Other attacks 
have occurred since 2002, when the music industry commenced its robust 
efforts to combat e-piracy.112 
 
[33]  A final novel anti-piracy strategy is “spoofing.”  Spoofing inundates 
peer-to-peer networks with fake MP3 files that look exactly like valid 
files.113 Once downloaded, the user attempts to listen to the music, and the 
“spoofed” MP3 either plays a damaged recording, an advertisement to buy 
the track, or nothing.114  The hope is that users will become frustrated and 
deterred from illegally downloading and instead take advantage of new, 
legal, downloading options.  Despite these efforts, e-piracy continues to be 
a pervasive problem, and is now approaching the shores of Hollywood in 
full force. 
 
V. HOLLYWOOD FIGHTS BACK 
 
[34]  Though it took some time, high-speed Internet access and e-piracy 
ingenuity have caught up to the movie industry.  Where it was once 
impractical to download an entire movie, this now can be done much more 
quickly.115  Using a dial-up Internet connection, a user can download a 
movie in twenty-four hours, but a high-speed user can acquire a complete 
full-feature film in as little as one hour.116  The question remains whether 
                                                          
110 John Borland, New RIAA File-Swapping Suits Filed, (Mar. 23, 2004), at 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5177933.html. 
111 Alex Viega, Recording Industry Web Site Apparently Downed for Five Days by 
Virus, DETROIT NEWS, (Mar. 23, 2004), at 
http://www.detnews.com/2004/technology/0403/24/technology-99755.htm. 
112 Id. 
113Katie Dean, Academics Patent P2P Spoofing, WIRED NEWS, (May 8, 2004), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,63384, 00.html. 
114 Id. 
115 See Pantages, supra note 12, at 156; Ted Greenwald, Decoding the Codes, WIRED 
MAG., (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.08/codecs.html 
(explaining methods of quicker downloading). 
116 See Pantages, supra note 12, at 156. 
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the music industry’s tactics (i.e., litigation, education, and even spoofing) 
will aid the movie industry’s battle to reclaim its annual $3 billion loss to 
illegal Internet activity.117  Its first line of defense, encryption, has already 
been breached. 
 
A. Nightmare on E-Street: DeCSS, DivX, DVD-X and DVD-X Copy  
 
[35]  The distribution of digital versatile disks (“DVDs”) in the mid-1990s 
subjected the movie industry to an increased threat of digital piracy.118  
Foreseeing this possibility, DVD technology inventors Toshiba and 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., created the Content Scramble 
System (“CSS”), an encryption coding system designed to prevent 
copying.119  Later, the DVD Copy Control Association, Inc., was created 
to control the licensing of this innovation, but the code was quickly 
broken.120   
 
[36]  In 1999, Jon Johansen (a.k.a. “DVD Jon”), a Norwegian teen 
computer hacker, created a decryption code to counter CSS, known as 
DeCSS.121  DeCSS enables individuals to copy DVDs to their hard drives, 
in a manner similar to music downloads.122  Johansen claimed he 
developed the code solely for non-infringing purposes, i.e., play-back of 
already purchased DVDs.123  He subsequently made the technology 
available on the web, providing widespread access to digitized movies.124  
Although the widespread availability of DeCSS has sparked litigation 
spurred by the movie industry, these actions have had seemingly little 
effect on its disbursement.     
 
                                                          
117 Motion Picture Association of America, Statement on Anti-Piracy, at 
http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
118 Pantages, supra note 12, at 162-63. 
119 DVD Copy Control Ass’n. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 6 (Cal. 2003), rev’d, 10 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
120 Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7. 
121 Id. 
122 Pantages, supra note 12, at 163. 
123 See generally John Leyden, DVD Jon Is Free – Official, THE REGISTER (Jan. 7, 
2003) (discussing the holding of the Norwegian court on the charges filed by the 
Norwegian Economic Crime Unit against Jon Johansen for producing the DeCSS DVD 
decryption utility), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/28749.html.  
124 See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (discussing the posting of the DeCSS software by Jon 
Johansen on the Internet to enable users to distribute movies). 
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[37]  After his trial in Norway, urged partially by the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”),125 Johansen was acquitted of all 
charges, including charges that DeCSS was an illegal technology and its 
distribution over the Internet was illegal.126  Today, this decryption 
technology is available on nearly one million Internet sites.127  
 
[38]  Adding to the ease of downloading, DivX, a new file compression 
technology, allows a DVD to fit on a single CD that can be downloaded 
within hours.128  DivX was copied from Microsoft by two hackers, and is 
available through movie downloading sites.129  Although movie 
downloading was originally difficult because of time and size,130 that is no 
longer the case. 
 
B. Decryption Technology Sparks Litigation 
 
[39]  The development and dissemination of DeCSS and DivX subjects 
the movie industry to rampant piracy.131  It is estimated that approximately 
400,000 to 600,000 movies are downloaded illegally each day.132  In 
response, the MPAA, like the RIAA, has attacked DeCSS distributors in 
court.133 
 
[40]  In two similar cases, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes and 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the MPAA sought to enjoin 
distributors from posting DeCSS and from creating hyperlinks to sites 
where the software could be obtained.134  These cases were brought 
                                                          
125 The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) serves as the 
voice and advocate of the American motion picture, home video and television 
industries from its offices in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. These members 
include Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 
Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corporation, Universal Studios, and Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 
See generally Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 15.  
126 Leyden, supra note 123. 
127 Pantages, supra note 12, at 164.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 164-65. 
130 Id. at 162. 
131 Id. at 165. 
132 Grossman, supra note 7, at 60. 
133 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
134 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 429; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294.   
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pursuant to the newly enacted DMCA,135 which explicitly provides that a 
court “may grant temporary or permanent injunctions on such terms as it 
deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation . . . .”136   
 
[41]  Under the DMCA, an effort to “circumvent a technological measure” 
is defined as an effort “to descramble a scrambled work, decrypt an 
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright 
owner.”137  Universal argued that DeCSS fell within the DMCA’s purview 
since it was designed for the sole purpose of descrambling,138 thus 
violating the DMCA.139  Agreeing with Universal, the court in both cases 
granted injunctions,140 finding that “DeCSS, a computer program 
unquestionably within the meaning of the statute . . . is a means of 
circumventing a technological access control measure,” and thus, violates 
the DMCA.141   
 
[42]  DeCSS distributors responded by challenging the DMCA’s validity, 
asserting their First Amendment free speech right to post DeCSS 
information on the web.142  More specifically, in Reimerdes and Corley, 
these distributors claimed computer code is a form of expression deserving 
constitutional protection.143  Although the court agreed that code is an 
expression to those able to read it, the court found the restriction (i.e., the 
injunction) was narrowly tailored so as to not impermissibly infringe on 
the speaker’s constitutional rights.144 
 
[43]  In evaluating this claim, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
and the District Court for the Southern District of New York had to first 
determine whether an injunction would be content-based or content-
neutral.145  A content-based injunction precludes speech based on its 
substance, whereas a content-neutral injunction precludes speech 
                                                          
135 See 273 F.3d at 429; 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1) (2000). 
137 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
138 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
139 Id.  
140 See 273 F.3d at 429; 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
141 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
142 See generally Corley, 273 F.3d at 429; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
143 Corley, 273 F.3d at 436; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304. 
144 Corley, 273 F.3d at 455; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
145 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327; see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 450. 
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regardless of substance.146  The two courts found the injunction on 
decryption technology to be content-neutral, thus the decision on whether 
it violated First Amendment rights required the court to balance the 
distributors’ interest in providing the technology against the studio’s 
interest in enjoining the action.147  Stated differently, the court had to 
determine whether the injunction restricted no more First Amendment 
freedoms than necessary to serve a significant government interest (i.e., 
copyright protection).”148  
 
[44]  Focusing on the DMCA’s purpose, the two courts determined that 
the injunction would not regulate expression, but would regulate DeCSS’s 
function as technology that promotes e-piracy.149  The Reimerdes court 
accordingly stated that: 
 
[a]s Congress’ concerns in enacting the anti-
trafficking provision of the DMCA were to 
suppress copyright piracy and infringement 
and to promote the availability of 
copyrighted works in digital form, and not to 
regulate the expression of ideas that might 
be inherent in particular anti-circumvention 
devices or technology, this provision of the 
statute properly is viewed as content 
neutral.150   
 
[45]  The court further noted that the consequences of allowing such 
expression in the digital age would mean that such information could be 
sent to Internet users all over the world in a short time, thus regulation is 
necessary to further a substantial government interest.151 
 
[46]  Accordingly, the Reimerdes and Corley courts, and subsequent 
decisions, determined that injunctions concerning DeCSS dissemination 
are content-neutral restrictions necessary to further a substantial 
government interest, and that the DMCA is sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to regulate as little speech as necessary.152  Finally, satisfying the final 
                                                          
146 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
147 See generally Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. 
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element in the determination of whether to issue injunctions, the courts 
found that irreparable harm would result should the injunctions not be 
issued, primarily for two reasons.153  First, DeCSS effectively eliminates 
DVD copyright protection, and thus without an injunction the studio 
would be forced to either accept piracy or expend resources innovating.154  
Second, the ability to download movies and then transfer and store the 
media decreases studio revenue.155 
 
[47]  In February 2004, DVD-X and DVD-X COPY, popular decryption 
programs similar to DeCSS and DivX, were also found to violate the 
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions.156  In 321 Studios v. MGM, a 
DVD-X and DVD-X COPY distributor157 sought a declaration that its 
product did not violate the DMCA.158  MGM counterclaimed, seeking the 
opposite.159 
 
[48]  After citing and discussing Reimerdes and Corley at length, the court 
held that the software “avoided” and “bypassed” the DVD encoding 
scheme, CSS, within the meaning of the DMCA’s provision proscribing 
such circumvention.160  The court also rejected 321’s argument that 
purchasers had permission to copy DVDs from the producers,161 and its 
argument that copying merely constituted fair use.162  Accordingly, as 
DVD-X and DVD-X COPY were held to violate the DMCA, the court 
enjoined 321’s distribution of DVD-X and DVD-X COPY, and ordered 
that the company stop manufacturing, distributing, or otherwise trafficking 
                                                          
153 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
157 321 Studios is no stranger to controversy. Hollywood has had it under 
scrutiny since the 2001 launch of its first product, DVD Copy Plus, which 
makes lesser-quality CD copies of DVD movies. In April [of 2002], fearing the 
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studios. The suit asks the court to rule that selling DVD Copy Plus does not 
violate the DMCA.  Tom Spring, New Tool Makes DVD Copying Easy; 321 
Studios Challenges Hollywood, DMCA Again with Release of DVD X Copy, PC 
WORLD (Dec. 3, 2002), available at 
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visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
158 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-90. 
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DVD circumvention software within seven days of its February 19, 2004, 
order.163   
 
[49]  Despite the Reimerdes, Corley and 321 Studio rulings, it appears e-
pirates have not been deterred.  As history has shown, once the “genie is 
out” (or once millions of copies of DeCSS, DivX, DVD-X and DVD-X 
COPY are themselves available for illegal download), it is nearly 
impossible to wrestle back into the lamp.164  Hollywood must find other 
ways to fight e-piracy. 
 
C. Preventive Measures 
 
[50]  To prevent losses resulting from premature dissemination of 
potential hit movies, studios are taking drastic measures.165  In an effort to 
stop Tom Cruise’s latest film, The Last Samurai, from making its way to 
the Internet before the sneak preview, Warner Brothers hand-delivered 
copies to projection rooms, searched theaters for recording devices, 
installed metal detectors, searched for and seized cameras and camera 
phones, and hired staff to walk the aisles with night-vision goggles.166  
Though drastic, these measures proved effective — somewhat.  Just days 
after its theatrical release, bootleg copies began surfacing on the web.167   
 
[51]  Warner Brothers investigated and determined that the copy was 
filmed via camcorder in a U.S. theater.168  An embedded tracking code 
indicated the theater from which it originated, but the studio released no 
specific information.169  Nonetheless, The Last Samurai’s release was a 
success; however, as Warner Brothers later emphasized, its early web 
availability indicates how pervasive e-piracy has become.170  Moreover, 
the studio’s protective efforts underscore the frightening speed and 
efficiency with which movies can find their way to the web.171   
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[52]  It is estimated that Hollywood lost $3.5 billion to illegal DVD 
downloading in 2003.172  This loss is projected to increase to $5.4 billion 
this year as the industry faces further technological development, which is 
rapidly diminishing the time it takes to download a movie.173  Relatedly, 
blank CD sales in 2001 were up 40% from the previous year, indicating 
that blank CD demand has grown along with increased downloading 
capabilities.174  
 
[53]  Despite technological “advances,” many of those engaged in movie 
piracy feel that Hollywood has little to lose from this illegal downloading 
compared to the effects endured by the recording industry.175  However, 
with the continual improvement of downloading technology, Hollywood 
studios will soon face the same problems.176  Hollywood should take 
action now, perhaps something similar to the recording industry’s 
remedial measures, to prevent the same lost revenues faced by the 
recording industry.177  As discussed, the measures include litigation, 
education, and “spoofing,” or lesser explored methods which espouse 
(rather than combat) the technology.178  However, Hollywood must also 
look to the enemy within.179 
 
D. The Enemy Within – OscarTM Implicated 
 
[54]  An AT&T study published on September 13, 2003, Analysis of 
Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie Production and Distribution 
Process, examined the top fifty films in U.S. theaters that appeared online 
between January 1, 2002, and June 27, 2003.180  The report evaluated web 
versions of movies, analyzing both sound and picture quality, as well as 
other effects of illegal copying and downloading.181  Further, the report 
examined the dates when movies first appeared online in comparison with 
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theatrical and home DVD/video release dates.182  The report then 
hypothesized as to the online copies’ origins.183 
 
[55]  The study found that 77% of illegal copies originated within the 
industry, seven films appeared on the Internet prior to their theatrical 
release date, and 163 were available before the DVD/video release date.184  
The study also identified time periods when most leaks occurred: the two-
week period surrounding the movie’s theatrical release and the three-week 
period leading to DVD/video release.185   
 
[56]  The results were shocking; the most privileged members of the film 
industry were perhaps its biggest threat.  But with a materialized threat 
comes an acquirable target.  In early 2004, the FBI made its first movie 
bootlegging arrest.186  The twist—the accused, Russell William Sprague, 
received “screeners” from actor and Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and 
Sciences (“the Academy”) member Carmine Caridi.187  The movies Caridi 
sent Sprague included The Last Samurai, Something’s Gotta Give, and Big 
Fish.188  Caridi sent the movies to Sprague, who copied them to DVD and 
returned the original movies to Caridi.189   
 
[57]  Last year, in anticipation of bootlegging, the MPAA banned screener 
DVDs.190 However, the ban was lifted after a court granted a temporary 
injunction to independent production companies that claimed the ban left 
them disadvantaged because their movies are not widely distributed.191  In 
response, the Academy now requires OscarTM voters to agree to keep the 
screeners for their private viewing, threatening expulsion from the 
Academy as a consequence for a violation.192   
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23, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-01-23-film-piracy-
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E. If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em – Hollywood Goes On-Line 
 
[58]  To combat e-piracy and cash-in on the Internet, Hollywood has 
entered the online marketplace.193  One distributor, Movielink, offers 
downloadable movies to pay-per-view members for $4-$5.194  Once a user 
chooses a movie, he can view it at any point during the next thirty days, 
but once the file is opened, it must be watched within twenty-four hours or 
it will be automatically deleted.195  In addition, the downloaded film is 
encrypted196 to prevent a customer from burning the movie to DVD. 
 
[59]  The industry must now consider whether this alternative will convert 
current illegal downloaders.  Today, a movie can be downloaded in hours, 
for free, and burned onto DVD before it is in theaters.197  While such acts 
are illegal, the movie industry, unlike the music industry, has yet to 
prosecute illegal downloaders or create effective and profitable online 
alternatives.  For the time being there appears to be nothing stopping e-
pirates from taking advantage of free movies.  The only advantage to the 
“legal” on-line consumer over using a pay-per-view service is an earlier 
release date.  Thus, Movielink and others may find themselves in direct 
competition with video stores, while offering little benefit to traditional 
movie rental (other than not having to leave one’s house).198  
 
[60]  Other “for-pay services” have entered the online market.  However, 
the services available continue to restrict what members can do with the 
media.199  To keep pace with illegal downloading, the music and movie 
industries must create better pay services. 
 
 F. Education - “Movies: They’re Worth It” 
 
[61]  In an effort to avoid the declining sales faced by the recording 
industry, the MPAA is striving to educate consumers about the effects of 
                                                          
193 See generally Katherine L. Race, The Future of Digital Movie Distribution on the 
Internet Antitrust Concerns with the Movielink and Movies.com Proposals, 29 RUTGERS 
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movies on the Internet for paying customers). 
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197 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 60. 
198 See Race, supra note 193, at 92-93. 
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illegally downloading movies.200  Such efforts include the creation of two 
MPAA websites, www.respectcopyrights.org and www.mpaa.com/anti-
piracy, and various trailers shown at theaters portraying e-piracy’s 
collateral effects.201  
 
[62]  The MPAA’s site, www.respectcopyrights.org, covers four effects of 
illegal movie downloading: direct harm to consumers if movies fail to 
make money, the effect movie decline will have on off-screen employees, 
computer vulnerability, and criminal risk.202 
 
i. You are cheating yourself! 
 
[63]  First, the MPAA highlights the effects on the consumer.203  The 
MPAA claims bootlegged movies lack quality, since they are often 
recorded by a camcorder.204  Poor quality, the MPAA believes, should 
deter illegal downloading since the movie loses the “real movie 
experience.”205   
 
[64]  Moreover, if illegal downloading continues, fewer people will go to 
the movies and the number of profitable movies will decline.206  As a 
result, studios will be forced to make fewer films, which, in turn, will 
harm consumer options.207  Even now, according to the MPAA, only four 
out of every ten films make a profit.208     
 
[65]  This sympathy-garnering effort, from an industry earning billions of 
dollars a year, appears to be receiving only a lukewarm reception.  It is 
suggested that while users might agree that studios could stop making 
movies to cover their losses, studios will lack sympathy from consumers 
as long as top stars continue to earn millions of dollars per film. 
                                                          
200 See Motion Picture Association of America, Statement on Anti-Piracy, at 
http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004); see also Press 
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ii. You are threatening the livelihood of thousands! 
 
[66]  As the MPAA suggests, people other than actors, directors and 
producers are involved in the movie-making process.209  Although illegal 
downloading may not be deterred by the studios or the major players—
actors, executives and directors—losing money, the MPAA hopes that for 
the harm e-piracy causes, consumers will appreciate that workers behind-
the-scenes are at risk.210 
 
[67]  Accordingly, the MPAA has produced several theatrical trailers, 
exhibiting various behind-the-scene workers discussing their jobs and the 
effects movie piracy will have on themselves and over 500,000 others in 
the field if illegal downloading continues.211  These workers include a 
stunt man, a set painter, and a make-up artist.212  Obviously, these trailers 
are another attempt to garner sympathy from consumers who may 
otherwise feel justified in downloading movies, considering the fortunes 
made by some in the industry.  The trailers’ effects remain to be seen. 
 
iii. Your computer is vulnerable! 
 
[68]  Movie downloading, like music downloading, can be accomplished 
through P2P networking.213  Though convenient and free, P2P networking 
has risks, including virus and worm susceptibility.214  Personal 
information, such as bank records and social security numbers, may be 
compromised.215  Also, once a user downloads a file, he may himself, 
perhaps unknowingly, become a pirated movie distributor and expose 
himself to civil and criminal liability.216   
 
[69]  This fear factor, however, is unlikely to be a deterrent.  Arguably, 
users know the risk of viruses and worms, but accept it by merely logging 
onto the web everyday.  If Hollywood continues to be uncommitted to 
prosecuting violators civilly and criminally, its empty admonitions will 
continue to fall on deaf ears. 
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iv. You are breaking the law! 
 
[70]  If caught, an e-pirate is subject to stiff penalties and fines; possibly 
years in prison and thousands of dollars in fines.217  However, there is not 
yet a set precedent for enforcement of pirated movies that would lead 
individuals to believe such conduct has real consequences. 
 
[71]  In addition to the MPAA’s four claimed effects, 
www.respectcopyrights.org also includes information regarding a new 
campaign sponsored by the MPAA and headed by Junior Achievement, 
Inc., entitled What’s the Diff?, which is available to middle school 
students.218  Its purpose is to educate young people about the need to 
protect copyrights and to attach a stigma to illegal downloading.219  The 
MPAA also provides links to profit-making websites where users can 
download movies legally, for a fee, including Cinemanow, Ifilm, 
Movieflix, and Movielink.220 
 
VI. RECENT E-PIRACY LEGISLATION 
 
[72]  The MPAA currently backs proposed legislation designed to impose 
strict penalties on e-piracy.221  One proposal, an expansion of the No 
Electronic Theft Act, the Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act 
(“ARTPA”), would increase fines and prison sentences.222  ARTPA 
specifically imposes harsher penalties on those who create or obtain 
movies prior to their theatrical release.223  Hollywood’s profits come from 
a carefully choreographed timing of distribution of the film across a 
variety of media, anchored by a film’s theatrical release; thus, the 
incentive to curb illegal pre-release dissemination.224  
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[73]  Additionally, “starting in July 2005, all digital video-recording 
devices—including digital VCRs and digital tuners—will recognize a 
‘broadcast flag’ encoded in the digital television stream.  Recorders must 
then encode a flagged program so it cannot be shared from machine to 
machine or over the Internet.”225  This regulation is partially aimed at 
curbing the MPAA’s problem of illegal redistribution of broadcast 
television.226  For now, the MPAA backs the federal regulation, but 
opponents suggest the measures are constitutionally over inclusive and 
could include benign activities such as taping a show for a friend.227  
Finally, the proposed Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, would “ban 
unauthorized recording in movie theaters and includes harsh penalties if 
pre-released movies are swapped on P2P networks.”228   
 
VII. RECENT LITIGATION – RIAA V. VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC. 
 
[74]  To pursue apparent copyright infringers, the RIAA must individually 
identify the users using P2P programs who share and trade files.229  The 
RIAA can easily find a user’s screen name and trace the user to his ISP 
with his associated IP address.230  But only the ISP can link the IP with a 
name and address.  Once the link is made, the RIAA can contact, or even 
sue, the person.231   
 
[75]  Prior to Verizon, the RIAA frequently used the DMCA’s subpoena 
provision232 to “compel ISPs to disclose the names of subscribers whom 
the RIAA believed were infringing its members’ copyrights.”233  Some 
ISPs complied with the RIAA’s subpoenas and identified subscribers’ 
names, and using the acquired information, the RIAA sent letters to and 
filed lawsuits against several hundred infringing individuals, “each of 
whom allegedly made available for download hundreds or in some cases 
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thousands of .mp3 files.”234  One such targeted ISP was Verizon Internet 
Services.  Verizon, however, drew a line in the sand, and in the summer of 
2002 refused to comply with an RIAA subpoena.235  
 
[76]  In defending its actions, Verizon argued that the DMCA precludes 
issuance of subpoenas to ISPs that merely act as conduits for P2P 
communications, since the subpoena request could not meet the 
requirement that such subpoenas contain “a copy of a notification [of 
claimed infringement, as] described in § 512(c)(3)(A).”236  In particular, 
Verizon maintained that the RIAA’s two subpoenas did not meet the 
requirements since Verizon is not storing the infringing material on its 
server, and it could not identify material “to be removed or access to 
which is to be disabled.”237  Since § 512(h)(4) makes satisfaction of the 
notification requirement a condition precedent to issuance, Verizon’s 
argument continued, the subpoenas were deficient.238   
 
[77]  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, following 
the Napster and Grokster logic, agreed with Verizon and held that DMCA 
subpoenas may only be issued to ISPs engaged in storing infringing 
material, and not to those merely acting as conduits.239  As the court 
explained, the subpoena validity depends upon the copyright holder 
having given the ISP effective notification under § 512(c)(3)(A).240   Thus, 
a subpoena may not be issued to a provider acting as a conduit for P2P 
sharing, which does not involve media storage.241 
 
[78]  As the court sympathetically noted, the problem for the RIAA (and 
presumably the MPAA) lies in the language of the DMCA itself.242  
Congress did not likely foresee the application of § 512 to P2P file sharing 
when the DMCA was drafted, and had it foreseen P2P’s development, it 
may have drafted the DMCA more broadly.243  For the time being, 
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however, issuance of § 512 subpoenas to an ISP acting as a P2P conduit is 
barred.244   
 
[79]  Hollywood is losing its war against P2P conduits on two fronts.  
According to Grokster, ISP activities that facilitate P2P sharing are 
lawful245 and, according to Verizon, their IP lists are secure.246  So what 
now for Hollywood?  Wait for Congress to act?  Perhaps, such action was 
all but urged by the Verizon court: 
The stakes are large for the music, motion picture, and 
software industries and their role in fostering technological 
innovation and our popular culture. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that even as this case was being argued 
[September 16, 2003], committees of the Congress were 
considering how best to deal with the threat to copyrights 
posed by P2P file sharing schemes.247 
 
[80]  Unfortunately, Congressional action will always be a step behind 
technological innovation.  Rather, Hollywood must stop sailing against the 
wind and view the Internet for what it is: an opportunity.  Hollywood must 
continue its educational efforts and provide superior online alternatives to 
illegal downloading, or hope that Congress acts to protect its shores.  It 
must become the innovator.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – HIDDEN TREASURE 
 
[81]  To date, Hollywood’s efforts to fight illegal downloading have not 
matched those of the recording industry—perhaps a wise move.  It is 
difficult to foresee whether, and to what extent, the recording industry’s 
litigation efforts will pay off.  What is apparent is the increasing 
popularity of legal music and movie downloading operations, perhaps a 
result of the recording industry and Hollywood’s education efforts.  For 
example, Apple’s iTunes has sold millions of songs, and other competitors 
are entering the market.248  Also, a recent report indicated that traditional 
music sales were up 9.1% over the first three months of 2004, compared 
with the first three months of 2003.249 
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[82]  Unlike the recording industry, Hollywood’s main focus appears to be 
consumer education.  On June 14, 2004, the MPAA announced that it was 
launching a new phase of “aggressive education” concerning movie 
piracy.250  According to an MPAA press release: 
The new phase will feature ads in daily newspapers and 
consumer magazines across the country, as well as in more 
than 100 college newspapers.  It will also include reaching 
out to parents, students and local groups to explain why 
movie piracy is illegal, how it impacts jobs and the 
economy and the consequences of engaging in illegal 
trafficking.  Additionally, in the coming months, anti-
piracy messages will appear in motion picture theaters 
across the country.251 
   
[83]  MPAA president Jack Valenti further noted: 
We hope this ramped-up information/educational campaign 
will cause those who are taking films without permission to 
stop their illegal activity. But we will keep all of our 
options open, including legal action. If we don’t react 
promptly to an ascending curve of illegal uploading and 
downloading soon to be reinforced with dazzling speeds 
rising from file-trafficking networks, we will live with an 
intense regret.  We have to do more to convince that 
minority of people who are engaged in this unlawful and 
infringing activity of the wrongness of their conduct.  We 
have to stem the tide of film theft online before it is too 
late, before it puts to peril the creative energy of the 
industry and the jobs of the nearly one million Americans 
who work within the movie industry.252 
 
[84]  Valenti is correct; hackers and e-pirates will continue to circumvent 
and distribute.  But he may be incorrect about stemming the tide before it 
is too late—it may be too late.  As mentioned previously, 400,000 to 
600,000 movies are illegally downloaded each day, and 39% of all adult 
Internet users (24% of all adult Americans) have high-speed Internet 
access at home.253 
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[85]  Along with its educational efforts, Hollywood must focus on 
capitalizing on the Internet’s potential, perhaps using iTunes as a model.  
It is still unclear whether users will be affected by trailer warnings 
concerning illegal downloading, but consumers will always be interested 
in receiving a superior product.  Hollywood, however, must address its 
continuing inability to release online movies sooner and concentrate on 
education as well as capitalization.  With such access and seemingly 
ineffective litigation efforts, the MPAA’s difficulty in deterring illegal 
downloading is not surprising.  Thus, Hollywood must remain focused on 
both education and capitalization. 
 
[86]  To capitalize on the online phenomenon, Hollywood must innovate 
and distribute faster, must offer better services, and should not waste 
valuable resources and damage public goodwill by pursuing e-pirates in 
court.  So far the MPAA has wisely refused to join the legal offensive, 
perhaps hoping to reap the benefits associated with high-profile music 
lawsuits without having to take the heat from outraged parents and 
consumers.254  This decision may be doubly wise since Verizon, as 
Hollywood would now find great difficulty in acquiring large numbers of 
individual targets for infringement lawsuits.255  If Hollywood wishes to 
litigate, however, it should attack those responsible for the initial 
dissemination: the scrupulous insiders discussed above. 
 
[87]  Meanwhile, while Hollywood refuses to modernize and capitalize on 
the goldmine at their fingertips, technology continues to decrease 
download time, and the number of computers flying the Jolly Roger 
grows. 
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